



New England Has Relied
Heavily on Vulnerable Medicaid
Financing Arrangement~
by Jeannette Hargroves and Robert TannenwaM
T
he New England states sharply increased
their outlays for Medicaid during the early
1990s (Chart 1). Forces beyond their con-
trol were partially responsible. The cost of health care
rose steeply. Caseloads grew as the regional economy
weakened and federal mandates broadened eligibility for
Medicaid. Furthermore, some states decided to make their
programs more generous than federal mandates required.
To some extent, however, the surge in Medicaid
spending reflected a decision by the federal government
to help states cope with the fiscal
stress prevalent during the early
1990s. Congress did not explicitly
appropriate additional assistance to
the states. Rather it temporarily per-
mitted them to take advantage of
regulations enabling them to garner
more federal Medicaid money with-
out committing matching funds.
Through special financial arrange-
ments, states used much of this ad-
ditional aid for general fund
purposes.
To some, these arrangements
were a questionable, albeit legal,
manipulation of regulatory loop-
holes. To others, they were a creative
policy response that permitted states
to maintain needed public services during a severe fis-
cal crisis. The purpose of this article is to describe these
arrangements and discuss the degree to which they may
have distorted figures for Medicaid spending in New
England.
All of these financing arrangements were designed
to obtain more federal payments known as Dispropor-
tionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment adjustments,
grants to hospitals that provide a disproportionate share
of medical care to low-income, uninsured patients. DSH
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Source: The Urban It~slilute. Based on HCFA 64 and HCFA 2082. Hea~th Care Financing Administration, December 1995.
payments were sought because federal laws used to give states considerable discretion
in administering them.
The design of these financing arrangements varied enormously from state to state.
In FY91 and FY92,l when the special financing arrangements were most prevalent,
states typically assessed a tax on hospitals, nursing facilities, physicians, and other pro-
viders of health care. These taxes were not always uniformly applied; sometimes the
definition of the tax base and the rate of tax varied from provider to provider.
States would place a portion of the receipts from these "provider" taxes into their
general fund and devote the remainder to DSH payments. The federal government
matched these state payments at a rate varying inversely with the average personal
income of a state’s residents. The states had considerable leeway in determining the
amount of their DSH payments qualifi]ing for federal matching grants and how both
the state and the federal shares of these payments would be distributed among provid-
ers. Using their discretion in distributing both provider tax burdens and DSH pay-
ments, states gave many providers payments roughly equal to their hospital tax liability,
holding them "harmless." In some states, practically all providers in the state were held
harmless, and the state gained general revenue almost entirely at the expense of the
federal government. The following is a hypothetical example of a typical financing
arrangement:
Example: A state imposes a 10 percent tax on the gross receipts of hospitals within
its borders. Hospital A pays a tax of $100,000. The state puts $50,000 of this tax
revenue into its general fund and refunds $50,000 to the hospital in the form of higher
DSH reimbursement per Medicaid patient treated. The federal government matches
these higher payments on a dollar-for-dollar basis, giving the state an additional $50,000.
The state funnels this additional $50,000 through to the hospital. The hospital is
"held harmless" because its total increased reimbursement of $100,000 is exactly the
amount that it pays in taxes. Meanwhile, the state increases its general revenue by
’ In this ariicle, Medicaid expenditure data are for federal fiscal years, unless otherwise noted.$50,000, the amount of the
additional federal matching
grant that it received.
States also channeled ad-
ditional federal Medicaid
funding into their general
fund by making DSH pay-
ments to state-owned hospi-
tals. Such payments qualified
for federal matching grants
that, under federal regula-
tions, could be used for other
parts of state Medicaid pro-
grams, in turn freeing up gen-
eral funds for other purposes.
Then, in a paper transaction,
the state-financed DSH pay-
ments immediately reverted
back to state general funds,
never having been spent on
medical care for anyone.
DSH Payments in Two Categories May Have Been Used
for Non-Medicaid Purposes
Maximum Possible Amount of DSH Payments Used
for Non-Medicaid Purposes in FY93
Millions of Dollars
DSH Payments to Provider Tax Paid Total Percent of
State-Owned Up to Amount of All Medicaid
Facilities DSH Payments Spending
Received in State
Maine 47.9 100.6 148.5 17
Massachusetts 1.9 310.9 312.8 8
New Hampshire 22.4 346.0 368.4 48
Rhode Island       95.3 0 95.3 11
Vermont 8.4 9.5 17.9 7
Note: Connecticut data not available. DSH payments and provider taxes for state fiscal year. Total Medicaid spending for
federal fiscal year.
Source: Leighton Ku and Teresa Coughlin: Medicaid Disproportionate Share and Other Special Financing P[ograms: A Fiscal
Dilemma for the States and the Federal Government (The Urban Institute. December 1994).
~Ul’ge in D~H Payrnont~
As a whole, the New England states, under severe
fiscal distress, were not shy in using DSH payments to
gain additional federal funding. Federal DSH match-
ing grants to the New England states mushroomed from
$2.3 million in FYg0 to $767 million in FY92 (Chart
1 and Table 1). Federal DSH payments as a percentage
of total federal Medicaid grants rose from 0.1 percent
to 17 percent.
Within the region, states differed widely in the ex-
tent to which they garnered additional federal DSH
funds. New Hampshire was by far the most aggressive
state in this regard. From a base of no federal DSH
funds in FYg0, New Hampshire’s federal DSH pay-
ments soared to 52 percent of the state’s total federal
Medicaid grants in FY92. Massachusetts, the next most
aggressive state, saw its DSH payments peak at 24 per-
cent in FYgl. The comparable peaks for the four re-
maining New England states, all attained in FY92,
ranged between 9 percent and 19 percent.
In response to the ballooning in federal DSH pay-
ments in many states, in 1991 and 1993 Congress en-
acted legislation restricting the use of the special
financing arrangements. Among other restrictions:
¯ State spending for DSH payments was limited to
12 percent of the state’s total Medicaid spending in any
given year, with the 12 percent limit being phased in
over time. (Because of the phase-in, including grand-
fathering provisions, some states are not expected to
see major reductions until the second half of the decade.)
¯ In general, explicit hold-harmless arrangements
were disallowed. States could not guarantee that a pro-
vider would receive back some or all of the amount of
the tax that it paid.
¯ Provider taxes had to be broad-based and applied
uniformly within any given class of providers. For ex-
ample, they could not be imposed on some hospitals
and not others.
The imposition of these restrictions slowed the
growth in federal DSH grants in New England. By
FY93, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont were
at or under the 12 percent cap. As of FY94, Connecti-
cut, Maine, and New Hampshire were still well above
it. With its DSH payments at 46 percent of total state
Medicaid spending as of FY94, New Hampshire still
faces major cutbacks. New Hampshire’s level of federal
DSH payments remained high in FY94 in part because
New Hampshire extended its room and meals tax to
medical care providers, thus avoiding some of the re-
strictions on provider taxes set by Congress. (See
Fiscal Facts, Winter 1994.)
Continued on last page
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F
our of New England’s governors plan
to cut current general fund budgets be-
cause of weak revenues in the first four months
of FY96. In Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont,
income tax collections have fallen below pro-
jections. In much of the region, sales tax receipts
have shown only modest year-over-year growth
(Chart 2). Rooms and meals tax revenues in New
Hampshire and Vermont missed their projected
targets, despite reportedly strong summer and
fall tourist seasons. By contrast, Massachusetts’
personal income and sales tax receipts grew
much more rapidly than those of other New
England states. With some fiscal breathing room,
the Commonwealth’s lawmakers modified the
formula for apportioning taxable corporate in-
come in a manner that will i’educe the tax bur-
den on most multistate manufacturers.
The spread of casinos in the region appears
to have slowed for the time being. After several
years of debate, the Connecticut legislature
turned down a proposed casino in Bridgeport,
which would have established a new legal pre-
cedent for casino gambling outside the state’s
reservation land. Massachusetts’ legislature post-
poned voting on Governor William Weld’s com-
pact with the Wampanoag tribe, which would
allow a casino in New Bedford and one in the
western part of the state. The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court ruled in early December that the
compact between the Narragansett tribe and the
former governor of Rhode Island was illegal be-
cause it lacked legislative approval.
Income and Sales Tax Revenues Grow Slowly in Most
New England States
Growth in Personal Income and Sales Tax Revenues





Note: New Hampshire has no sales or personal income tax.
Source: Official budget documents, state financial statements, and conversations with state budget officials.
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Connecticut
F
our months into FY96, Connecticut’s tax rev-
enues were a modest 3 percent above year-ago ¯
levels. Personal income tax receipts were up 6 percent;
however, sales tax revenues were only 2 percent higher.
Collections from corporate business taxes were on tar-
get but, as anticipated, slightly below year-ago levels
because of tax rate reductions passed by the legislature
in FY95. (See Fiscal Facts, Fall 1995.) As of October
31, 1995, the comptroller was projecting a $35 mil-
lion general fund deficit in FY96.
Officials anticipate Connecticut’s fall tax amnesty
program will boost FY96 revenues by at least $40 mil-
lion, almost one-third more than initially projected. The
tax commissioner promised not to penalize
Connecticut’s delinquent taxpayers who filed between
September 1 and midnight, November 30, 1995. As of
December 1, 1995, the state had collected $34 million
in back taxes.
Nonresident entertainers were also eligible for the
tax amnesty effort. Connecticut recently decided to
enforce the 4.5 percent tax on income earned in the
state by non-resident entertainers. The entertainment
tax has been on the books since 1991. Lawmakers an-
ticipate stricter enforcement of this tax will generate an
additional $4.5 million a year for the state. Collections
will help fund college scholarships, meals for the home-
less, and counseling for drug addicts.
After several years of debate, the state senate turned
down a proposal by the Mashantucket Pequot tribe to
build and operate a $875 million casino resort on the
Bridgeport waterfront, despite the overwhelming vote
of approval by Bridgeport residents.
Lauren Fine
M
aine’s general fund revenues, sluggish in the
first quarter of FY96, picked up in October.
Nevertheless, in mid-December officials revised down-
?q(~v ~t~tdl~ltt~l l~i.scal F~l(:ts
ward their revenue estimates for FY96, anticipating a
potential shortfall of $14.8 million.
Total tax revenues for the first four months of FY96
were slightly below projections, growing 3 percent over
year-earlier levels. Personal income tax receipts per-
formed moderately well (Chart 2); however, revenues
from sales taxes were 3 percent below plan and barely 1
percent over a year ago. Collections from corporate in-
come taxes compounded revenue worries, missing their
target by 8 percent, because of two unexpectedly large
tax refunds. Faced with precarious revenues, Governor
Angus King ordered state agencies to cut discretionary
spending by almost one-third, hoping to save the state
$10 million to $15 million in this fiscal year.
Governor King is moving forward on his promise
to downsize state government. The FY96-97 biennial
budget gives the governor the authority to reduce gen-
eral fund outlays by $45 million over the next two years
as a step toward balancing the budget. The governor
and the legislature have agreed on $25 million in sav-
ings, which would eliminate over 800 state jobs, re-
shape eight departments, and overhaul the state’s
correctional system. But the governor still needs to find
another $20 million to reach his goal of $45 million by




our months into FY95, Massachusetts’ revenues
appeared to be in excellent financial shape. Total
revenues were running 5 percent above year-ago levels,
slightly above the midpoint of the state’s predicted range.
Sales and income tax collections posted year-over-year
rates of growth of 6 percent and 9 percent, respectively,
the highest in the region.
The state legislature, confident about the state’s
revenue projections, approved a tax relief measure for
multistate manufacturers that alters the formula for
determining the Commonwealth’s share of their total
taxable income. According to the new formula, this
5share will depend solely on the ratio of the
manufacturer’s sales in Massachusetts to its total sales.
Currently, the Commonwealth determines its share of
the taxable income of manufacturers according to a
formula that takes into account in-state-to-total ratios
of a company’s payroll and property owned as well as
its sales. For defense contractors, the measure takes ef-
fect January 1, 1996; for other manufacturers, it will
be phased in over five years. Multistate non-manufac-
turers will continue to be subject to the three-factor
formula. Administration officials estimate the tax break
will cost the Commonwealth $80 million to $120 mil-
lion a year once fully implemented.
The legislature ended its 1995 session in mid-No-
vember without approving Governor William Weld’s
agreement with the Wampanoag Indian tribe, which
spells out details for the development of a casino in
New Bedford. Under the agreement, the tribe would
pay the state $90 million a year for the next six years
for the exclusive right to operate a casino. The compact
allows for 700 slot machines at each of the state’s four
racetracks and the construction of a casino in one of
three western Massachusetts towns. Voters in Spring-
field and Chicopee defeated gambling referenda in
November, leaving Holyoke the only one of the three
to approve casino development. "
Approval of the New Bedford casino rices two
hurdles when lawmakers return in January. The legisla-
ture must approve both the tribal-state compact and
the transfer of the New Bedford site-- formerly a public
golf course -- from eminent domain to private owner-
ship. The U.S. Department of Interior has deferred
approval of the compact until legislative approval is




or the first four months of FY96, New
Hampshire’s general fund unrestricted revenues
were 5 percent below year-ago levels and 4 percent be-
low expectations. Collections from the meals and rooms
tax and uncompensated care pool tax were especially
weak, falling 5 percent and 17 percent, respectively,
below target. Shrinkage in the latter tax, which is lev-
ied on gross hospital receipts, is attributable to an un-
expected decline in patient services. Other revenue
sources, especially the business profits tax and lottery
sales, generally fared well. Business profits tax receipts
grew 14 percent over year-ago levels and stood 11 per-
cent above projections. Sweepstakes commission sales
were higher than expected by 4 percent. The introduc-
tion of the multi-state powerball lottery in November
1995 is expected to generate $6 million in FY96. The
state education fund projects $48 million in overall
sweepstakes earnings over the next fiscal year.
The legislature gave the go-ahead for a welfare re-
form plan that includes a "workfare" program for wel-
fare recipients and the reorganization of the Department
of Health and Human Services. Under the new
"workfare" program, individuals can receive welfare for
only 26 weeks. After this period, individuals seeking
assistance must have a job or participate in a manda-
tory work-for-benefits program. The state will encour-
age work by deducting only 50 cents from welfare
payments for every dollar of income earned on the job.
Lawmakers anticipate that this change will increase the
family income of welfare recipients by $100 to $200 a
week. The reorganization of the department includes a
$32 million cut in department expenditures, accom-
plished through a hiring freeze, reduced payments to





ike revenues of many other states, Rhode Island’s
revenues performed poorly during the first four
months of FY96, causing state revenue estimators to re-
vise downward their projections for FY96. As of October,
total tax estimates were revised downward by $22.8 mil-
lion from the original budget of early August. Much of
the erosion came from lowered estimates of personal in-
come and sales taxes, which dropped by $10 million and
$4 million, respectively. Four months into FY96, year-
over-year growth of 4 percent in personal income tax re-
ceipts was, in large part, attributable to one large one-time
tax payment. Without this one payment, officials estimated
a 2.6 percent growth in income tax collections. Similarly,
sales revenues were up only 2 percent compared with year-
earlier levels.
Weak revenues as well as higher-than-anticipated
outlays portend a $58 million deficit in the current fiscal
year, 3 percent of the $1.7 billion FY96 budget. In re-
sponse, Governor Lincoln Almond has asked state agencydirectors to identifi/programs for possible elimination.
He has also announced plans to withdraw appropriations
totaling $11.4 million; however, these withdrawals, pri-
marily accounting measures, are not expected to affect
services.
Fiscal worries have prompted the Division of Taxa-
tion to strengthen enforcement of the state’s use tax, a 7
percent tax on goods purchased by Rhode Island residents
outside the state. (All states with a sales tax impose a
complementary use tax in order to deter residents from
purchasing goods in border states that tax sales more
lightl)~) The recent intense public criticism of the tax has
motivated the governor and some legislators to consider
lowering the use tax rate, applying it only to expensive
purchases, or repealing it entirely.
Fiscal pressures have not deterred the governor from
opposing casino development. In early December, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the former gov-
ernor did not have the constitutional right or statutory
authority to bind the state to a casino compact with the
Narragansett tribe without the approval of the General
Assembly. Accordingly, the tribe has asked Governor Al-
mond and legislative leaders to resume negotiations over
a compact; however, the governor has stated he would
only negotiate a compact that involved casino games cur-
rendy allowed under state law. He remains opposed to a





ermont’s first-quarter FY96 tax receipts were ex-
tremely weak, although they strengthened
somewhat in October. Total revenues for the first four
months of FY96 grew a meager 1.4 percent over their
year-earlier level, standing $10 million below the state’s
projected target. Disappointing personal income tax
receipts, the chief culprit, posted a year-over-year de-
cline of 0.6 percent.
One note of encouragement came from October’s
sales tax receipts and collections from rooms and meals
taxes, which were up 6 percent and 8 percent, respec-
tively, from the previous October. These gains, largely
driven by a strong fall tourist season, unfortunately did
not carry over to the transportation fund’s gasoline tax
receipts, which fell 22 percent in that same month com-
pared with a year earlier.
In anticipation of a weak revenue performance and
cuts in federal aid, budget officials lowered their FY96
revenue estimate by $30.1 million in July. Vermont al-
ready has a $14.5 million cumulative deficit on its books
carried over from last fiscal year. In mid-November,
under the shadow of a bond-rating review, Governor
Howard Dean and legislative leaders agreed to elimi-
nate the state’s projected cumulative deficit by fiscal
year’s end. In order to balance the FY96 budget, they
would reduce spending by an estimated $23.3 million.
On the revenue side, they would, among other things,
draw on designated funds, including $5 million from
the Health Care Access Trust Fund, and hope to collect
an additional $4 million in revenues from the enhanced
delinquent tax collection program. These steps along
with other transfers are expected to generate a current
year surplus of $9.5 million. The surplus combined with
a proposed $5.0 million transfer from Vermont’s trans-





affect New England’s economy?
In 1992, Connecticut became
the first New England state to
allow casino gambling within
its borders. Since then, the
region’s other states have seri-
ously considered whether to
follow Connecticut’s example.
One of the most controversial,
unresolved issues in these de-
bates has been the economic
effects of casino development.
While interest in this issue is
intense, relevant empirical evidence is scant. For this rea-
son, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston held a one-day Sym-
posium on Casino Development on June 1, 1995, bringing
together experts from academia, government, Native Ameri-
can nations, and the gaming industry. This special report
summarizes the participants’ remarks.
Copies of Casino Development: How would casinos affect New
England’s economy?may be obtained without charge by writ-
ing to Research Library - D, Federal Reserve Bank of Bos-
ton, P.O. Box 2076, Boston, MA 02106-2076. Or telephone
(617) 973-3397.Medicaid Spending
Continued from p. 3
rBrhithor tho DoIlar~?
The extent to which dollars counted as Medicaid
spending may have been used for other purposes is not
clear. Two hypothetical scenarios bracket the range of
possibilities:
¯ At one extreme, Medicaid spending figures have
dramatically overstated the amount of money actuall);
spent on medical care for the poor and uninsured. Pri-
vate providers have used their DSH payments exclu-
sively to offset their provider tax liability, not to expand
health care to individuals eligible for Medicaid. In ad-
dition, DSH payments, both state and federal, to state-
owned hospitals have immediately reverted to state
general funds, without having been spent on medical
care for anyone. A study conducted by the Urban In-
stitute, based on a FY93 survey, suggests that most DSH
payments to state-owned facilities were, in fact, chan-
neled in this manner.
If this scenario is correct, then two types of DSH
payments should be subtracted from each state’s total
Medicaid spending to obtain a more accurate estimate
of how much Medicaid money the s~ate actually spent
on health care for the poor and uninsured:
(1) DSH payments to state-owned facilities; and
(2) DSH payments to private health care providers
up to the amount they paid in provider taxes.
The Urban Institute has obtained the figures
needed to make these adjustments in FY93 for 39 states,
including all New England states except Connecticut.
The impact of these adjustments for the other states
within the region is shown in Table 2. In New Hamp-
shire, up to 48 percent of reported Medicaid spending
in FY93 may have been for other purposes. The com-
parable percentages for the other four states range from
7 percent in Vermont to 17 percent in Maine.
¯ At the other extreme, all Medicaid outlays were
used to provide care to patients eligible for Medicaid.
Rather than return DSH payments to their state’s gen-
eral fund, state hospitals spent them on care for the
poor and uninsured. Rather than always hold provid-
ers harmless, provider tax schemes redistributed funds
in favor of institutions with heavy Medicaid caseloads,
enabling them to provide care for Medicaid patients
that otherwise would not be feasible. Institutions that
were held harmless nonetheless used their additional
DSH payments to expand care for the poor rather than
to offset their provider tax liability. They passed the
burden of their provider taxes on to paying patients, in
the form of medical fees.
Irnpll~tion~ for the F~utuI~
Medicaid financing arrangements have demon-
strated the difficulty of ensuring that all of the funds
for a given program are spent on their intended pur-
pose. Congress is likely to take this lesson into account
as it considers how the financing of Medicaid should
be changed. Future issues of Fiscal Facts will discuss the
implications for the New England states of alternative
federal Medicaid reform proposals. ~
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